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Aditya Vikram
Institution:
Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur
Observed institution:
Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur
OpenAlex ID:
A5044570146
Stability and optimal double auction design for a two-sided market
2024
·
Aditya Vikram
·
Mathematical Social Sciences
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1
Worst-case efficient and budget-balanced mechanism for single-object allocation with interdependent values
2023
·
Aditya Vikram
·
Social Choice and Welfare
·
1
A welfare-maximizing mechanism for single-object allocation problem with interdependent values
2026
·
Aditya Vikram
·
SSRN Electronic Journal
A top-only mechanism with reserve price for single-good allocation problem
2022
·
Aditya Vikram
·
Economics Letters
Probability-Burning Mechanism with Reserve Price for Single-Good Allocation Problem
2022
·
Aditya Vikram
·
SSRN Electronic Journal
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Works count:
5
Citation count:
2
H-index:
1
I10-index:
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