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Gorkem Celik
Observed names:
Celik, Gorkem,
Gorkem, Celik
Institutions:
École Supérieure des Sciences Économiques et Commerciales,
Théorie Économique, Modélisation et Applications
Observed institutions:
École Supérieure des Sciences Économiques et Commerciales,
University of British Columbia,
Théorie Économique, Modélisation et Applications,
Théoriser et Modéliser pour Aménager,
ESSEC Business School
ORCID:
0000-0002-8456-3331
Observed ORCID:
0000-0002-8456-3331
OpenAlex ID:
A5063807072
Mechanism design with collusive supervision
2008
·
Gorkem Celik
·
Journal of Economic Theory
·
69
Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation
2009
·
Gorkem Celik
, Okan Yilankaya
·
The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics
·
42
Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism
2011
·
Gorkem Celik
, Michael Peters
·
Games and Economic Behavior
·
27
Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints
2005
·
Gorkem Celik
·
Games and Economic Behavior
·
27
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures*
2023
·
Gorkem Celik
, Dongsoo Shin
, et al.
·
Journal of Industrial Economics
·
9
Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider
2021
·
Gorkem Celik
, Dongsoo Shin
, et al.
·
The RAND Journal of Economics
·
8
PDF
Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design
2016
·
Gorkem Celik
, Michael Peters
·
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économique
·
8
Resale in second-price auctions with costly participation
2017
·
Gorkem Celik
, Okan Yilankaya
·
International Journal of Industrial Organization
·
7
Implementation by Gradual Revelation
2015
·
Gorkem Celik
·
The RAND Journal of Economics
·
6
Informative Certification: Screening versus Acquisition
2026
·
Gorkem Celik
, Roland Strausz
·
The Review of Economic Studies
·
5
Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion
2005
·
Gorkem Celik
·
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
·
4
To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes 1
2005
·
Gorkem Celik
, Serdar Sayan
·
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
·
4
Informative Certification: Screening vs. Acquisition
2025
·
Gorkem, Celik
, Strausz, Roland
·
Econstor (Econstor)
·
3
Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties
2008
·
Gorkem Celik
·
The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics
·
3
On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers
2008
·
Gorkem Celik
, Serdar Sayan
·
Review of Economic Design
·
2
Informative Certification: Screening vs. Acquisition
2026
·
Celik, Gorkem
, Strausz, Roland
·
OPUS 4 (Zuse Institute Berlin)
Ideal Default for Resolving Disputes Efficiently
2024
·
Nejat Anbarci
, Gorkem Celik
·
International Economic Review
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Works count:
21
Citation count:
225
H-index:
7
I10-index:
4
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