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Sergei Severinov
Observed names:
S. Severinov,
Sergei Severinov B,
Sergei Severinov,
Severinov, Sergei
Institution:
University of British Columbia
Observed institutions:
University of Essex,
National Research University Higher School of Economics,
University of Wisconsin–Madison,
University of British Columbia,
Duke University,
University of Toronto,
Universidad Autónoma de Coahuila,
Yahoo (United States),
Stanford University
show all 9
ORCID:
0000-0002-0730-5152
Observed ORCID:
0000-0002-0730-5152
OpenAlex ID:
A5065214062
Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices
1997
·
Michael Peters
, Sergei Severinov
·
Journal of Economic Theory
·
228
Internet auctions with many traders
2005
·
Michael Peters
, Sergei Severinov
·
Journal of Economic Theory
·
162
Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle
2003
·
B. Douglas Bernheim
, Sergei Severinov
·
Journal of Political Economy
·
147
Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission
2016
·
Rossella Argenziano
, Sergei Severinov
, et al.
·
American Economic Journal Microeconomics
·
72
PDF
Mechanism design with partial state verifiability
2008
·
Raymond Deneckere
, Sergei Severinov
·
Games and Economic Behavior
·
65
Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
2007
·
Grigory Kosenok
, Sergei Severinov
·
Journal of Economic Theory
·
49
An efficient solution to the informed principal problem
2008
·
Sergei Severinov
·
Journal of Economic Theory
·
42
The value of information and optimal organization
2008
·
Sergei Severinov
·
The RAND Journal of Economics
·
34
PDF
Mechanism Design and Communication Costs
2002
·
Raymond Deneckere
, Sergei Severinov
·
SSRN Electronic Journal
·
28
Screening when some agents are nonstrategic: does a monopoly need to exclude?
2006
·
Sergei Severinov
, Raymond Deneckere
·
The RAND Journal of Economics
·
27
Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle
2000
·
B. Douglas Bernheim
, Sergei Severinov
·
National Bureau of Economic Research
·
24
PDF
On Information Sharing and Incentives in R&D
2001
·
Sergei Severinov
·
The RAND Journal of Economics
·
20
Mechanism design and communication costs
2001
·
Raymond Deneckere
, Sergei Severinov
·
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
·
14
Investment and Information Acquisition
2022
·
Dimitri Migrow
, Sergei Severinov
·
American Economic Journal Microeconomics
·
11
Investment Tournaments: When Should a Rational Agent Put All Eggs in One Basket?
2010
·
Michael Schwarz
, Sergei Severinov
·
Journal of Labor Economics
·
11
Multi-Dimensional Screening with a One-Dimensional Allocation Space.
2009
·
Raymond Deneckere
, Sergei Severinov
·
10
Optimal Screening with Costly Misrepresentation.
2007
·
Raymond Deneckere
, Sergei Severinov
·
9
Optimal and efficient mechanisms with asymmetrically budget constrained buyers
2021
·
Alexei Boulatov
, Sergei Severinov
·
Games and Economic Behavior
·
6
An ascending double auction
2007
·
Michael Peters
, Sergei Severinov
·
Economic Theory
·
6
Individually Rational, Balanced-Budget Bayesian Mechanisms and the Informed Principal Problem
2004
·
Grigory Kosenok
, Sergei Severinov
·
SSRN Electronic Journal
·
6
Internet Trading Mechanisms And Rational Expectations
2004
·
Sergei Severinov
, Michael Peters
·
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
·
5
Does a Monopoly Need to Exclude?
2003
·
Sergei Severinov
, Raymond Deneckere
·
SSRN Electronic Journal
·
5
Signalling, screening and costly misrepresentation
2022
·
Raymond Deneckere
, Sergei Severinov
·
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économique
·
4
Growing Crops in Arid, Drought-Prone Environments: Adaptation and Mitigation
2022
·
Nicholas P. Sisto
, Sergei Severinov
, et al.
·
Hydrology
·
4
PDF
Disclosure and Legal Advice
2017
·
Yeon-Koo Che
, Sergei Severinov
·
American Economic Journal Microeconomics
·
4
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Works count:
68
Citation count:
1,014
H-index:
13
I10-index:
16
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