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René Kirkegaard
Observed name:
Rene Kirkegaard
Institution:
University of Guelph
Observed institutions:
Brock University,
Aarhus University,
Queen's University,
University of Guelph,
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council
OpenAlex ID:
A5070749238
Favoritism in asymmetric contests: Head starts and handicaps
2012
·
René Kirkegaard
·
Games and Economic Behavior
·
110
A Mechanism Design Approach to Ranking Asymmetric Auctions
2012
·
René Kirkegaard
·
Econometrica
·
61
Asymmetric first price auctions
2009
·
René Kirkegaard
·
Journal of Economic Theory
·
55
A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
2017
·
René Kirkegaard
·
Theoretical Economics
·
40
PDF
Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands
2008
·
René Kirkegaard
, Per Baltzer Overgaard
·
The RAND Journal of Economics
·
39
Using Economic Theory to Guide Numerical Analysis: Solving for Equilibria in Models of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions
2012
·
Timothy P. Hubbard
, René Kirkegaard
, et al.
·
Computational Economics
·
32
A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result
2005
·
René Kirkegaard
·
Economic Theory
·
25
Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit Demand
2003
·
René Kirkegaard
, Per Baltzer Overgaard
·
SSRN Electronic Journal
·
24
Handicaps in incomplete information all-pay auctions with a diverse set of bidders
2013
·
René Kirkegaard
·
European Economic Review
·
17
Ranking Asymmetric Auctions using the Dispersive Order
2011
·
René Kirkegaard
·
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
·
12
Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach
2017
·
René Kirkegaard
·
Games and Economic Behavior
·
11
Ranking asymmetric auctions: Filling the gap between a distributional shift and stretch
2014
·
René Kirkegaard
·
Games and Economic Behavior
·
11
Pre-Auction Offers in Asymmetric First-Price and Second-Price Auctions
2005
·
René Kirkegaard
, Per Baltzer Overgaard
·
Games and Economic Behavior
·
11
Auctions Versus Negotiations Revisited
2002
·
René Kirkegaard
·
10
Favoritism in asymmetric contests
2010
·
Rene Kirkegaard
·
Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory on Conference on Future Directions
·
9
Favoritism in Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps
2008
·
René Kirkegaard
·
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
·
9
Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds
2008
·
Rene Kirkegaard
·
The B E Journal of Theoretical Economics
·
9
Contest Design with Stochastic Performance
2023
·
René Kirkegaard
·
American Economic Journal Microeconomics
·
8
Asymmetric Auctions with More Than Two Bidders
2015
·
Timothy P. Hubbard
, René Kirkegaard
·
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
·
7
Participation fees vs. reserve prices in auctions with asymmetric or colluding buyers
2005
·
René Kirkegaard
·
Economics Letters
·
6
Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices
2022
·
René Kirkegaard
·
Games and Economic Behavior
·
5
Incomplete information and rent dissipation in deterministic contests
2012
·
René Kirkegaard
·
International Journal of Industrial Organization
·
5
PDF
Preferential Treatment may Hurt: Another Application of the All-Pay Auction
2010
·
René Kirkegaard
·
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
·
4
Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous Contests: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds
2007
·
René Kirkegaard
·
RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
·
2
Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions
2021
·
René Kirkegaard
·
Journal of Mathematical Economics
·
1
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Works count:
39
Citation count:
530
H-index:
11
I10-index:
14
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