Linguistic Knowledge and Cognitive Integration
Year: 2012
Type: article
Abstract: According to the Propositional Attitude view (PAV), a speaker is competent in her language by virtue of holding propositional attitudes towards the contents of her internal grammar. This paper develops an objection to PAV, called the “Integration Challenge”. This argument, originally suggested by Stich (1978) and Evans (1981), comprises two premises: (1) propositional attitudes are characterized by their inferential integration with other doxastic states, and (2) the cognitive states that store grammatical information are not inferentially integrated. I consider and reject replies to this argument made by Dwyer and Pietroski (1996), Higginbotham, (1987) and Knowles (2000).
Source: Crítica (México D F En línea)
Author: Edison Barrios
Institution: Syracuse University
Language: English
Subfield: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Field: Psychology
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: hybrid
OpenAlex ID: W1007497401