Work

A Short Primer on Situated Cognition

Year: 2001
Type: book-chapter
Abstract: In recent years there has been a lot of buzz about a new trend in cognitive science.The trend is associated with terms like 'embodiment', 'enactivism', 'distributed cognition', and 'the extended mind'.The ideas expressed using these terms are a diverse and sundry lot, but three of them stand out as especially central.First, cognition depends not just on the brain, but also on the body (the embodiment thesis).Second, cognitive activity routinely exploits structure in the natural and social environment (the embedding thesis).Third, the boundaries of cognition extend beyond the boundaries of individual organisms (the extension thesis).Each of these theses contributes to a picture of mental activity as dependent on the situation or context in which it occurs, whether that situation or context is relatively local (as in the case of embodiment) or relatively global (as in the case of embedding and extension).It is this picture of the mind that lies at the heart of research on situated cognition.According to our usage, then, situated cognition is the genus, and embodied, enactive, embedded, and distributed cognition and their ilk are species.This usage is not standard, though it seems to us as good as any (for competing proposals, see Anderson, 2003;Clancey, 1997;Wilson, 2002).In this brief introductory chapter, we present a bird's-eye-view of the conceptual landscape of situated cognition as seen from each of the three angles noted above: embodiment, embedding, and extension.Our aim is to orient the reader, if only in a rough and provisional way, to the sprawling territory of this handbook.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W101710890
FWCI:
Cites: 37
Cited by: 210
Related to: 8