Year: 1995
Type: article
Abstract: In this article, we directly attack Professors Wachter and Cohen's assertion regarding the economic efficiency of the Mackay doctrine. Applying internal and external labor market analysis, we argue that the Mackay doctrine is economically inefficient because it allows employers to behave “opportunistically” with respect to employees that have made “firm-specific” investments in their employing firms. To remedy this problem we propose a new “negotiations approach,” the components of which are: (1) the statutory overruling of Mackay, and (2) the concomitant amendment of the NLRA to make the striker replacement issue a “mandatory” subject of collective bargaining.
Authors: Rafael Gely, Leonard Bierman
Language: English
Topic: Legal and Labor Studies
Subfield: Industrial relations
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1025547340