Work

When Can the Maximin Share Guarantee Be Guaranteed?

Year: 2016

Type: conference-paper

Abstract: The fairness notion of maximin share (MMS) guarantee underlies a deployed algorithm for allocating indivisible goods under additive valuations. Our goal is to understand when we can expect to be able to give each player his MMS guarantee. Previous work has shown that such an MMS allocation may not exist, but the counterexample requires a number of goods that is exponential in the number of players; we give a new construction that uses only a linear number of goods. On the positive side, we formalize the intuition that these counterexamples are very delicate by designing an algorithm that provably finds an MMS allocation with high probability when valuations are drawn at random.

Source: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v30i1.10041

Authors: David Kurokawa, Ariel Procaccia, Junxing Wang

Institution: Carnegie Mellon University

Language: English

Topic: Game Theory and Voting Systems

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: diamond

Funder: National Science Foundation

Awards: AF: Small: Fair Division at Scale, CAREER: A Broad Synthesis of Artificial Intelligence and Social Choice, ICES: Small: Computational Fair Division: From Cake Cutting to Cloud Computing