Work

Market equilibrium with performance contracts in the presence of exogenous turnover and matching frictions. BEBR 92-0138

Year: 1992
Type: article
Abstract: We consider market equilibrium with renegotiation-proof performance contracts.The contracting model is similar to the model posed by MacLeod and Malcomson (1989).The market model is somewhat different.We impose exogenous turnover as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and introduce an additional friction in matching that is not considered in either of these papers.We show there is a multiplicity of such equilibria that range in both employment and the distribution of income, with an inextricable link between the two.As the equilibrium match population increases, agents on the long side of the market claim a greater share of the product from a match.Consequently, agents on the short side prefer equilibria that entail a smaller than maximal match population.However, when the turnover probability goes to 0, all but a small fraction of the agents on the short side are matched and agents on the long side have reservation utility near 0, in any equilibrium.Thus, the conclusions of MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) depend crucially on the absence of turnover.We also extend our model to the case of heterogeneous firms, and show that our results carry over to this case as well.The heterogeneous firm case points to important empirical implications that can be derived from the model.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1176548615
FWCI: 1.833
Cites: 14
Cited by: 2
Related to: 9