Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of 'Just' Punishment
Year: 2002
Type: article
Abstract: Deterring Retributivismas nothing more than "a triumph, or glorying in the hurt of another...[which is] contrary to reason [,] ... against the Law of Nature and is commonly stiled by the name of Cruelty.'21 But the tables have now turned; it is retributivism which now claims to reflect our aspiration to higher moral principles and it is consequentialism that is widely considered morally unpalatable.My project is not to defend a consequentialist theory of punishment, but to displace retributivism's place on the high moral ground.Just as retributivism is said to turn back the crime on the criminal, 22 I will seek to turn back retributivism's principal criticisms of the consequentialist theory onto itself.As a result, I conclude that retributivism is no better than consequentialism as a theory of punishment.And it is perhaps worse.By presenting new arguments demonstrating that retributivism fails to satisfy its own criteria of just punishment, the injustice of the "theory of just punishment" is revealed.By showing that retributivism falls victim to its own withering critique of other theories of punishment, retributivism succumbs to its own "Ishmael effect.' 2 3 That is, 1947) (located in part 2-2, question 108, 1st article).But punishment may be lawful if it is imposed with the intention that good consequences would result: If, however, the avenger's intention be directed chiefly to some good, to be obtained by means of the
Source: bepress Legal Repository
Author: Russell Christopher
Language: English
Subfield: Law
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W126681267
