Organization Theory, Intelligence, and the Cuban Missile Crisis
Year: 2010
Type: preprint
Abstract: Although scholars have been dissecting the Cuban missile crisis for almost half a century, this paper argues that we have learned the wrong intelligence lessons and neglected many important ones. Organizations explain why. Ever since Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision, scholars have concentrated on the pitfalls of individual perception and cognition while paying little attention to organizational weaknesses in intelligence. As a result, researchers have considered the crisis a stunning intelligence success instead of a stunning intelligence warning failure. And they have overlooked the silent but deadly organizational weaknesses that led analysts to make the wrong call. In part one, I make the empirical case for calling the crisis an intelligence failure by examining all of the pre-crisis national intelligence estimates of 1962. In part two, I discuss why the success narrative has stuck and why it matters. Part three explores three lingering questions from the historical record: (1) Why did estimators miss all of the signals pointing to Nikita Khrushchev’s true intentions? (2) Why were all of the pre-crisis estimates so consistent even in the face of alarming new evidence of a Soviet military buildup? (3) Why were there no dissents in any of the estimates? To date, answers have focused on mirror imaging and other aspects of misjudgment. Yet I find that organizational deficiencies also played a pivotal and unexplored role-causing signals to be found and then lost in the bureaucracy; driving the interagency estimates process toward a false consistency over time; and channeling dissenting hypotheses out of the Cuba estimates process entirely.
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
Author: Amy Zegart
Institutions: Hoover Institution, Stanford University
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1481717953
