Work

Teams Punish Less

Year: 2013

Type: preprint

Abstract: Many decisions in politics and business are made by teams rather than by single individuals. In contrast, economic models typically assume an individual rational decision maker. A rapidly growing body of (experimental) literature investigates team decisions in different settings. We study team decisions in a public goods contribution game with a costly punishment option and compare it to the behavior of individuals in a laboratory experiment. We also consider different team decision-making rules (unanimity, majority). We find that teams contribute significantly more and punish less than individuals, regardless of the team decision rule. Overall, teams yield higher payoffs than individuals.

Source: SSRN Electronic Journal

Authors: Heike Auerswald, Carsten Schmidt, Marcel Thum, Gaute Torsvik

Institutions: Technische Universität Dresden, University of Mannheim, Ifo Institute for Economic Research, University of Bergen

Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Subfield: Economics and Econometrics

Field: Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W1482490054

Cites: 25

Cited by: 1

Related to: 10