Year: 2007
Type: conference-paper
Abstract: In this paper we make a comprehensive study of the complexity of the problem of deciding the ex-istence of equilibria in strategic games with incom-plete information, in case of pure strategies. In par-ticular, we show that this is NP-complete in gen-eral Bayesian Games in Standard Normal Form, and that it becomes PP-hard (and, in fixed-precision scenarios, PP-complete), when the game is repre-sented succinctly in General Normal Form. Suit-able restrictions in case of graphical games that make the problem tractable are also discussed. 1
Authors: Georg Gottlob, Gianluigi Greco, Toni Mancini
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1484002945