Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution
Year: 2008
Type: article
Abstract: Language is a powerful coordination device. We generalize the cheap-talk approach to pre-play communication by way of introducing a meaning correspondence between messages and actions, and by postulating two axioms met by natural languages. Players have a lexicographic preference, second to material payoffs, against deviating from the meaning correspondence. Under two-sided communication in generic and symmetric n × n-coordination games, a Nash equilibrium component in such a lexicographic communication game is evolutionarily stable if and only if it results in the unique Pareto efficient outcome of the underlying game. We extend the analysis to one-sided communication in arbitrary finite two-player games. (JEL C72, C73, Z13)
Source: American Economic Review
Authors: Stefano Demichelis, Jörgen W Weibull
Institutions: University of Pavia, Stockholm School of Economics
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1484076407