Efficient Self-Coordination in Policy Networks: A Simulation Study
Year: 1994
Type: preprint
Abstract: The paper begins with a reexamination of claims regarding the welfare-theoretical\nefficiency of various modes of non-hierarchical policy coordination which Charles\nLindblom (1965) had subsumed under the label of "Partisan Mutual Adjustment". It\nis argued that these claims are implausible if Lindblom’s mechanisms of horizontal\nself-coordination are examined one at a time. They either will not assure significant\nwelfare gains in the general case, or the attempt to raise the level of general welfare\nthrough self-coordination will encounter rapidly escalating transaction costs. As Lindblom\nhad pointed out, however, several coordination methods will often be combined\nin real-world policy processes. The intuition that this might significantly increase the\nwelfare efficiency of self-coordination is explored in a computer simulation study based\non the game-theoretical reformulation of five simple coordination mechanisms. We\ncan show that, in a given population of interdependent actors, "Positive Coordination"\nwithin relatively small coalitions who are required to obtain the agreement of outside\nactors through "Negative Coordination" and "Bargaining", are able to achieve relatively\nhigh welfare gains while economizing on transaction costs. This pattern is by no means\nunusual in real-world policy processes.
Authors: Fritz W. Scharpf, Matthias Mohr
Language: English
Subfield: Public Administration
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1486991513
