Year: 2004
Type: preprint
Abstract: We analyse the impact of micro-founded political institutions on environmental policy and economic growth. We model an overlapping-generations economy, where individuals differ in preferences over the environment (as well as in age). Labour taxation and capital taxation is used to finance a public good and a public production factor, period by period. The underlying political institution is a parliament. Party entry, parliamentary composition, coalition formation, and bargaining are endogenous. The benchmark is when all decisions are taken in parliament. We compare this constitution with an independent regulator, elected in parliament. The regulatory regime causes lower pollution, but production inefficiency.
Authors: Laura Marsiliani, Thomas I. Renström
Institution: Durham University
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: political institutions, environmental policy, economic growth, overlapping generations model, public goods, labor taxation, capital taxation, parliamentary composition, coalition formation, bargaining, independent regulatory agencies, environmental preferences, pollution, production inefficiency
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1489066356
