Strategic Constitutional Choice in an Autocracy: The 1980 Constitution in Chile. ∗
Year: 2011
Type: preprint
Abstract: This paper looks into the possibility for a self-interested autocrat to select a constitution which in a dynamic game is voluntarily accepted by a succeeding democratic constitutional assembly as a blue print for negotiations on constitutional reform. We assume that a constitution assigns property rights and has a redistributional and a communitarian policy dimension. Strong inequality of the income distribution may pose a problem for existence of sustainable constitutions whilst a middle class opposing strong redistribution facilitates existence. We use our results to explain the different transition paths of Chile and post-communist democracies.
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
Authors: Katja Michalak, Gerald Pech
Institution: American University in Bulgaria
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1494817045