Could Humphrey Have Gone to China? Measuring the Electoral Costs and Benefits of Making Peace
Year: 2004
Type: other
Abstract: Theoretical arguments for why “it takes a Nixon to go to China” \nemphasize either the superior credibility that hawks have in \nadvocating peace or the superior political benefits they enjoy in \ndoing so. This paper looks for evidence of these effects in the \ncanonical case: that of U.S. rapprochement with China in the \nearly 1970s. I use counterfactual simulations on data from the \n1968 National Election Study to explore the political effects of a \nproposal to open relations with China, focusing on whether and \nhow those effects would depend on who made the proposal: \nRichard Nixon or Hubert Humphrey. I find evidence of both the \ncredibility and electoral security effects hypothesized in the \ntheoretical literature. In particular, there is a very dramatic \nasymmetry in the political costs and benefits of proposing peace: \nwhile such a proposal would have been electorally costly for \nHumphrey, it could have been an electoral boon for Nixon.
Author: Kenneth Schultz
Institution: University of California, Los Angeles
Language: English
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W149558711
