Year: 2000
Type: preprint
Abstract: In this paper we show that a simple model of reciprocal preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is the rule. However, when communication or informal sanctions are available appropriation behavior is more efficient. Our analysis shows that these regularities arise naturally when a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal preferences.
DOI: 10.5167/uzh-51957
Authors: Falk, Armin, Fehr, Ernst, Fischbacher, Urs
Institutions: University of Bonn, University of Zurich, University of Konstanz
Language: English
Subfield: Safety Research
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1496343255