Year: 2013
Type: article
Abstract: : N. Cartwright’s results on invariance under intervention and causality (2003) are reconsidered. Pro-cedural approach to causality elicited in this paper and contrasted with Cartwright’s apparently philosophical one unravels certain ramifications of her results. The procedural approach seems to license only a constrained notion of intervention and in consequence the “correctness to invariance ” part of Cartwright’s first theorem fails for a class of cases. The converse “invariance to correctness ” part of the theorem relies heavily on modeling assumptions which prove to be difficult to validate in practice and are often buttressed by independently acquired evidence.
Author: Paweł Kawalec
Language: English
Subfield: History and Philosophy of Science
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W149797