Year: 1997
Type: preprint
Abstract: : This paper reports an experiment comparing three stag hunt games that have the same best-response correspondence. The games have the same expected payoff from the mixed equilibrium, but differ in the pecuniary incentive a player has to play a best response to other mixtures. In each game, risk dominance conflicts with payoff dominance and selects an inefficient pure strategy equilibrium. We find statistically and economically significant evidence that the expected earnings difference helps explain observed behavior. Key Words: Payoff dominance, risk dominance, probabilistic choice, exponential fictitious play, bounded rationality, random utility, logistic response equilibria, human behavior. JEL Classification: c72, c78, c92, d83. Acknowledgements: We thank Bill Rankin and Nick Rupp for research assistance, SimonAndersonandRichardMcKelvey for helpful discussions, Dan Friedman, Robert Forsythe, Paul Straub, Martin Sefton, and their collaborators for making their data available to u...
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1501095465
