Work

An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators

Year: 1986

Type: report

Abstract: This paper analyses data on union and employer rankings of different panels of arbitrators in an actual arbitration system.A random utility model of bargainer preferences is developed and estimated.The estimates indicate that unions and employers have similar preferences, in favor of lawyers, more experienced arbitrators, and arbitrators who seem to have previously favored their side.Alternative rankings models, which are estimated to test whether bargainers rank arbitrators strategically, reveal no evidence of strategic behavior.

Source: National Bureau of Economic Research

DOI: 10.3386/w1938

Authors: David Bloom, Christopher Cavanagh

Institutions: National Bureau of Economic Research, Harvard University, Princeton University

Language: English

Topic: Labor Movements and Unions

Subfield: Public Administration

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDGs: Peace, justice, and strong institutions, Decent work and economic growth

Open Access status: green

Funder: National Science Foundation