Year: 2012
Type: article
Abstract: ABSTRACT This paper investigates whether gubernatorial elections affect state governments’ accounting choices. We identify two accounts, the compensated absence liability account and the unfunded pension liability account, which provide incumbent gubernatorial candidates with flexibility for manipulation. We find that, in an election year, the liability associated with compensated absences and unfunded pension liabilities are both systematically lower. We also find that the variation in these employment‐related liabilities is correlated with proxies for the incumbent's incentives and ability to manipulate their accounting reports. Jointly, these results suggest that state governments manipulate accounting numbers to present a healthier financial picture in an election year.
Source: Journal of Accounting Research
Authors: NOLAN KIDO, REINING PETACCHI, JOSEPH WEBER
Language: English
Subfield: Accounting
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1502035979
