Year: 2012
Type: article
Abstract: It is argued that there are two ‘master’ intuitions about knowledge⎯an anti-luck intuition and an ability intuition⎯and that these impose distinct epistemic demands. It is claimed that recognising this fact leads one towards a new proposal in the theory of knowledge⎯anti-luck virtue epistemology⎯which can avoid the problems that afflict other theories of knowledge. This proposal is motivated in contrast to two other ways of thinking about knowledge which are shown to be ultimately unsuccessful: anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology. Finally, a diagnosis is offered of why our concept of knowledge should have the kind of structure dictated by anti-luck virtue epistemology.
Source: The Journal of Philosophy
Author: Duncan Pritchard
Institution: University of Edinburgh
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1503848103