Work

Experimental Comparisons of Auctions Under Single‐and Multi‐unit Demand

Year: 1998

Type: article

Abstract: An English clock auction and a sealed‐bid auction with lowest accepted‐bid pricing are studied in a controlled laboratory setting. Buyers bid for either a single unit or two units of the good. The sealed‐bid auction generates more revenue than the English clock auction in both cases. The revenue from the English clock auction is lower in the two‐unit demand environment than in the single‐unit demand environment, due to strategic demand reduction on the part of bidders. (JEL C92, D44)

Source: Economic Inquiry

DOI: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01697.x

Authors: PAUL ALSEMGEEST, CHARLES NOUSSAIR, MARK OLSON

Institutions: Erasmus University Rotterdam, Purdue University West Lafayette

Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: bronze

OpenAlex ID: W1506440764

FWCI: 6.137

Cites: 28

Cited by: 80

Related to: 10