Year: 1992
Type: article
Abstract: E~ a VERYBODY agrees that we have intrinsic desires.Obviously, we have desires; many of them are derivative; so, in a kind of analogy to a deductive theory that divides its provable statements into axioms and theorems, some of them must be basic.There is much less agreement about what our intrinsic desires are or should be.Still, no one doubts that we intrinsically desire, among other things, happiness, pleasure, and the absence of pain, certain qualities of our sensations, feelings, moods, and psychological states in general.We desire these things, but without having, or feeling the need to have, a justification for doing so.Desires come in various strengths, and, together with more or less firm beliefs, they guide rational action.The formal counterparts of these concepts in decision theory are utility and probability.The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic desires is also reflected in decision theory, where each model contains a utility function that is basic (at least relative to that model) and an expected utility function that is derived from the basic utility function and the subjective probability function of the model.'On the whole, decision theory certainly provides the best formal explication of our intuitive reasoning about desires and beliefs in practical deliberation.A person's intrinsically desired psychological states should thus be in the domain of her utility function.But then, we claim, decision theory fails.More specifically, we shall defend two theses:(a) If a decision situation exhibits a certain causal structure, then
Source: The Journal of Philosophy
DOI: 10.2307/2026890
Authors: Anna Kusser, Wolfgang Spohn
Language: English
Subfield: General Decision Sciences
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1507708239