Year: 2010
Type: preprint
Abstract: Building on the results of a participant observation in a Chinese IT-sector company\nlocated in the northern part of China, this paper aims to clarify the nature of deception\nin markets. Contrary to the position of information economics and game theoretical\napproaches to trust, the paper argues that deception is not reducible to a question of\nopportunism or sending signals in order to create trustworthiness. Deception, in fact,\nmay coexist and even be strictly entangled with self-deception, which builds on the\nconception of an agent whose rationality can fail or whose cognition can be biased.\nThis paper argues that rationality failures and cognitive biases are not driven by psychological\nmechanisms alone. They have to be related to the social structure in which economic\nactors operate. In particular, the paper focuses on anticipatory socialization as\none source of self-deception and the deception of others. Both types of deception are\nassociated with a gap between aspirations and the available resources necessary for attaining\nthem.
Authors: Laura Gruss, Geny Piotti
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1507723801