Work

Extended Cognition and Functionalism

Year: 2009
Type: article
Abstract: Andy Clark and David Chalmers argue that the mind sometimes extends outside the body to encompass features of the environment (HEC). HEC has been criticised by Fred Adams, Kenneth Aizawa, and Robert Rupert. In this paper, I argue for two claims: (1) HEC is a harder target than those critics have supposed; HEC is entailed by functionalism, a commonly held view in philosophy of mind, and one to which those critics are already committed. (2) The version of HEC entailed by functionalism is more radical than the version that Clark and Chalmers suggest. I argue that this version of HEC is so radical as to form a counterexample to functionalism. The conclusion of the paper is against both HEC and functionalism. 1 Andy Clark and David Chalmers claim that cognitive processes can and do extend outside the head. 1 Call this the ‘hypothesis of extended cognition ’ (HEC). HEC has been strongly criticised by Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa and Robert Rupert. 2 In this paper I argue for two claims. First, HEC is a harder target than Rupert, Adams and Aizawa
Author: Mark Sprevak
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1509922667
FWCI: 3.27
Cites:
Cited by: 170
Related to: 9