The Theory of Alimony
Year: 1989
Type: article
Abstract: Although alimony has long been a feature of divorce law, there is no theory explaining why either spouse should have a financial obligation to the other that survives their marriage. Explanations based on gender roles, or assessments of blame for the marriage's failure, are inconsistent with modern attitudes. More recently, commentators and courts have suggested that contract or partnership concepts explain alimony obligations. In Part I of this Article, Professor Ellman demonstrates the inadequacy of theories that use analogies to contract or partnership to explain or justify the imposition of alimony obligations. In Part II he offers a new theory of alimony based on a societal policy of encouraging sharing behavior in marriage by requiring compensation, at divorce, for the loss in earning capacity arising from such sharing behavior. Employing three basic principles, subsidiary rules, and numerous examples, Part II develops this general policy into a comprehensive theory.
Source: California Law Review
DOI: 10.2307/3480529
Author: Ira Mark Ellman
Institutions: Arizona State University, University of California, Berkeley
Language: English
Topic: Family and Matrimonial Law
Subfield: Law
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1518211123