Economics of compliance: a review of theories and an application to agriculture
Year: 2008
Type: book
Abstract: Farmer-regulator relationships like cross-compliance are highly characterized by information asymmetries. Economic literature offers several ways to analyse them. The classical deterrence approach bases on the assumption of a utility maximising agent who complies with rules as long as the net utility of compliance will be higher than the net utility of an offence. Recent evidence challenges this result. Experiments show that people behave more honest than the classical model predicts. Main objective of the paper is to compare the various approaches from economics, psychology and sociology to explain compliant behaviour. Additionally, an outlook for empirical applications of the theories reviewed here is given to motivate further research.
Authors: Thomas Herzfeld, R.A. Jongeneel
Language: English
Subfield: Public Administration
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1532553891