Year: 2005
Type: article
Abstract: In Illinois v. Lidster, 1 the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit motorist checkpoints carried out with the purpose of requesting information from vehicle occupants about a previously-committed crime. 2 The Court deemed such stops to be constitutional when they advance the public interest in solving a crime to a degree that outweighs any interference with individual liberties as a result of the stop.3This Note argues that the Supreme Court properly reasoned that its decision in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 4 in which the Court held unconstitutional checkpoints conducted without any individualized suspicion and "to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing," 5 is distinguishable from Lidster and should not control.The Supreme Court was correct in reasoning that a lack of individualized suspicion is not fully 'determinative of an informational stop's constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment.Further, the Supreme Court was consistent in holding that special law enforcement concerns will sometimes justify such stops, as the Court had previously articulated in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz 6 and United States v. Martinez-Fuerte.7 Finally, the Supreme Court properly held that the reasonableness of the checkpoint stop in Lidsterand, thus, its constitutionality-should be determined by applying the balancing test set forth in Brown v. Texas.8 However, this Note also argues 540 U.S. 419 (2004).2 Id. at 424.Id. at 427. 4 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
Author: Jessica E. Nickelsberg
Language: English
Topic: Criminal Law and Evidence
Subfield: Law
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Keyword: Fourth Amendment
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1543863892
