Information Revelation and Policy Responsiveness in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes
Year: 2010
Type: preprint
Abstract: Despite widespread scholarly interest in electoral authoritarian regimes, formal modeling has been lacking on the function of authoritarian elections and their influence on policy and regime development. This study introduces a formal mechanism through which controlled elections credibly reveal information on citizen preferences by offering a balance of patronage and policy concessions. To support the theory, the paper presents the first cross-country analysis of policy-setting within electoral authoritarian regimes, finding that falling vote totals for the ruling regime are associated with higher education spending and lower military spending. Finally, the paper offers case-study evidence from Singapore and Egypt.
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
Author: Michael K. Miller
Institutions: Australian National University, Princeton University
Language: English
Subfield: Sociology and Political Science
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1545924549
