Work

Voters, legislators and bureaucracy: Institutional design in the public sector

Year: 1978
Type: article
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to outline a theory of representative democracy which explains why rational actors construct an excessively bureaucratized government. We define excessive bureaucratization as the selection of an inefficient production technology for the public sector, characterized by relative factor proportions that entail more bureaucracy than the proportions that would minimize total costs. Thus, the question of excessive bureaucracy is related to but conceptually different from whether a particular policy is worthwhile. Furthermore, it presumes a concern more fundamental than the observation that implementing a public policy inevitably requires the expenditure of scarce resources.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1547238915
FWCI: 5.044
Cites: 11
Cited by: 71
Related to: 10