Social Connections and Group Banking
Year: 2007
Type: article
Study design: Observational Study
Abstract: Lending to the poor is expensive due to high screening, monitoring and enforcement costs. Group lending advocates believe lenders overcome this by harnessing social connections. Using data from FINCA‐Peru, I exploit a quasi‐random group formation process to find evidence of peers successfully monitoring and enforcing joint‐liability loans. Individuals with stronger social connections to their fellow group members (i.e., either living closer or being of a similar culture) have higher repayment and higher savings. Furthermore, I observe direct evidence that relationships deteriorate after default, and that through successful monitoring, individuals know who to punish and who not to punish after default.
Source: The Economic Journal
Author: Dean S. Karlan
Institution: Yale University
Language: English
Subfield: Economics and Econometrics
Domain: Social Sciences
SDG: No poverty
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W2066593412
