Year: 2014
Type: book
Abstract: Some philosophers suggest that a minimal form of self-awareness is an integral element of the way in which all experiences are given (SPC: self-presenting claim).The main argument for this is that the phenomenological quality of 'mineness' of the experience reveals the self as a part of all experiences.Since the sense of mineness is taken as intrinsic to the givenness of the experience, it counts as an argument for the SPC.In this essay, I assess this claim and its main argument.After describing the phenomenological approach to selfawareness that grounds the discussion, I comment on some pathological cases that challenge the SPC.After this, I examine the standard reply in defence of the SPC and I focus the discussion on cases of thought insertion.I conclude that although the standard reply adds interesting elements to the general discussion, it becomes philosophically problematic especially when it tries to deal with cases of thought insertion.
Author: Pablo López‐Silva
Language: English
Topic: Mental Health and Psychiatry
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1554316365