Work

Estimating Matching Games with Transfers

Year: 2016
Type: report
Abstract: Economists wish to use data on matches to learn about the structural primitives that govern sort-ing. I show how to use equilibrium data on who matches with whom for semiparametric estima-tion of match production functions in many-to-many, two-sided matching games with transferable utility. Inequalities derived from equilibrium necessary conditions underlie a maximum score es-timator of match production functions. The inequalities do not require data on transfers, quotas, production levels, or unmatched agents. The estimator does not suffer from a computational or data curse of dimensionality in the number of agents in a matching market, as the estimator avoids solving for an equilibrium and estimating first-stage match probabilities. I present an empirical application to automotive suppliers and assemblers. ∗Thanks to SupplierBusiness as well as Thomas Klier for help with the empirical application. I thank the National
Author: Jeremy Fox
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1559300196
Cites: 86
Cited by: 90
Related to: 10