Year: 2012
Type: report
Abstract: Patent pools, which allow competing firms to combine their patents, have emerged as a prominent mechanism to resolve litigation when multiple firms own patents for the same technology.This paper takes advantage of a window of regulatory tolerance under the New Deal to investigate the effects of pools on innovation within 20 industries.Difference-in-differences regressions imply a 16 percent decline in patenting in response to the creation of a pool.This decline is driven by technology fields in which a pool combined patents for substitute technologies by competing firms, suggesting that unregulated pools may discourage innovation by weakening competition to improve substitutes.
DOI: 10.3386/w18316
Authors: Ryan Lampe, Petra Moser
Language: English
Subfield: Management of Technology and Innovation
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1562293376
