Spontaneous Collective Action
Year: 2009
Type: preprint
Abstract: We propose a dynamic, probabilistic model of collective action. While agents’ incentives are approximately captured by the normal form suggested in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984), agents’ behavior is only boundedly rational. The model deÞnes a discrete time, discrete state Markov process. We identify the process’ unique limiting distribution and show that in the long-run even in large populations mass protests may occur as rare, sudden events of comparatively short duration. Moreover, mass collective action is possible in the absence of any coordination device. We then show that our model can be used to give a formal “as-if” interpretation of game-theoretic analyses of collective action.
Authors: Daniel Diermeier, Jan A. Van Mieghem
Institution: Northwestern University
Language: English
Topic: Game Theory and Applications
Field: Decision Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1564223297
