Searching the Parameters of the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement--Reasonableness Gone Overboard: United States v. Villamonte-Marquez
Year: 2012
Type: article
Abstract: The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.1 A search or seizureThe fourth amendment provides:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.U.S. CONST.amend.IV.In the early cases involving the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court applied a literal interpretation to the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, defining the interest protected in terms of property law concepts.1 W. RiNGEL, SEARcHEs & SEizUREs, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 1.2, at 1-3 (2d ed.1983); see, e.g., Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (fourth amendment protection does not extend to open fields); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1921) (seizure of private papers unreasonable even without showing of force or coercion).This literal interpretation manifested itself in the doctrine of "protected zones," which approximated the borders of a person's property, within which the fourth amendment could be violated only if the intrusion were made by a government official.1 W. RINGEL, supra, § 1.2, at 1-3.This concept led to such distinctions as that between curtilage, which was protected under the fourth amendment, and open fields, which were not protected.Id.; see Hester, 265 U.S. at 59.It was not until Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967), that fourth amendment protection was defined in terms of a privacy, rather than a property, interest.277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); 1 W. RINGEL, supra, § 1.2, at 1-5.In Olmstead, the majority held that a person's telegraph or telephone messages did not come within the purview of the fourth amendment.277 U.S. at 465.Dissenting, Justice Brandeis argued that "every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment."Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).The Court eventually adopted Justice Brandeis' analysis.See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (fourth amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures on the street); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (fourth amendment protection extends to people rather than places).Prior to the 1960's, the fourth amendment was, with rare exceptions, applied only to [Vol.58:383 made without a warrant is considered unreasonable unless it falls within certain limited exceptions. 2 Section 1581(a) of Title 19 of the United States Code authorizes customs officers to stop and board any vessel at any time and place in the United States or within customs waters without a warrant for the purpose of examining the vessel's documentation and conducting a search.3 In upcriminal investigations. 1 W. RINGEL, supra, § 1.3, at 1-7.The Court has since applied the fourth amendment to many types of government activity.See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967) (housing inspections).In addition, the fourth amendment has been held applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 2 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 486 (1964); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).Some of the exceptions to the warrant requirement are searches and seizures incident to lawful custodial arrests, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973), searches and seizures based on probable cause where exigent circumstances exist, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970), searches and seizures by consent, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973), administrative inspections, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981), emergency situations, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978), welfare visits, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971), inventory searches of impounded vehicles, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372-73 (1976), "stop and frisk" procedures, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968), seizures of objects in "plain view," e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968), and border searches, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 621 (1977).For a discussion of the various exceptions to the warrant requirement, see 1 W. RINGEL, supra note 1, chs.9-17.At common law, evidence obtained through an illegal search or seizure was admissible. 1 J. VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMuNrrms 39 (1961); 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EW-DENCE § 2183, at 5 (3d ed.1940).The fourth amendment, while preserving "the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures," does not expressly "provide any remedy for the violation of this right." 1 W. RiNGEL, supra note 1, § 1.5, at 1-16.In order to fill this void, the Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule, which provides for the suppression of evidence obtained from an unreasonable search or seizure.Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).The Weeks Court explained: "the duty of giving [the fourth amendment] force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws."Id. at 392.The Supreme Court also has made the rule applicable to state prosecutions under the fourteenth amendment.See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).The exclusionary rule applies to all evidence directly obtained in an illegal search or seizure and to any derivative evidence obtained from information revealed by the "unreasonable" search or seizure. 1 W. RINGEL, supra note 1, § 3.2, at 3-3; see, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).8 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1982).Section 1581(a) provides:Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or vehicle at any place in the United States or within the customs waters or, as he may be authorized, within a customs-enforcement area established under the Anti-.Smuggling Act, or at any other authorized place, without as well as within his district, and examine the manifest and other documents and papers and examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to this end may hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary force to compel compliance.
Source: St. John's law review
Author: Lawrence A. Levy
Institution: St. John's University
Language: English
Topic: Criminal Law and Evidence
Subfield: Law
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1566469524
