Economics of labour co-determination in view of corporate governance
Year: 1997
Type: preprint
Abstract: The article examines the economic effects of co-determination (by supervisory boards) with regard to theoretical and empirical aspects. We show theoretically, that co-determination can be an efficiency-increasing institution in a market-based economy. An empirical check of the economic effects of German co-determination fails because of the non-existence of large companies without co-determination. Co-determination can also be found in corporate governance systems in other European countries. In the EC a harmonization of co-determination on corporate level is not yet achieved. The reason is the specific historical development of industrial relations in Europe. Instead of an integration through harmonization the European Commission favors system competition with good reasons.
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
Authors: Helmut Wagner, Elmar Gerum
Institutions: FernUniversität in Hagen, Philipps University of Marburg
Language: English
Topic: Labor Movements and Unions
Subfield: Public Administration
Field: Social Sciences
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1567934354