Key drivers of 'good' corporate governance and the appropriateness of UK policy responses : final report
Year: 2007
Type: book
Abstract: The DTI’s Corporate Law and Governance strategy aims to promote and deliver an effective \nframework for corporate governance in the UK, giving confidence to investors, business, and \nother stakeholders to underpin the relationship between an organisation and those who hold \nfuture financial claims against that organisation. However, corporate governance involves \nvarious problems of asymmetric information and incomplete contracts that generate a need for \npublic policy responses to mitigate market failures and ensuring that companies moves towards \n‘good’ corporate governance. Since the early 1990s, the UK has been very active in \nundertaking policy reforms that includes a number of corporate governance codes, expert \nreports, a high level review of company law, and new regulations and legislation. These policy \ninitiatives need to be monitored and evaluated in terms of their success in influencing the key \ndrivers of ‘good’ corporate governance. \nThis Report undertaken for the DTI has several aims: to identify key drivers of good corporate \ngovernance based on a review of social science literature; to describe the content of UK \nregulatory initiatives with regard to those drivers; and to evaluate gaps in the content and \nimplementation of UK policy regarding corporate governance, using those drivers as \nbenchmarks. In addition, some further implications of this study are discussed for future policy \nand research on UK corporate governance. \nThe Report identifies key drivers of good corporate governance based on extensive review of \nthe broad social science literature. Good corporate governance is defined here with regard to \nthe rights and responsibilities of company stakeholders, and the wealth-creating and wealthprotecting \nfunctions of corporate governance within this context. Based on this definition, a \ndetailed review of the theoretical and empirical social science literature on corporate \ngovernance was undertaken across seven broad areas: boards of directors, shareholder \nactivism, information disclosure, auditing and internal controls, executive pay, the market for \ncorporate control, and stakeholders. The result was the identification of 18 key ‘drivers’ or \ngovernance mechanisms, which promote ‘good’ corporate governance. An internet-based \nsurvey of international corporate governance experts was conducted in order to confirm and \nfurther specify these drivers in relation to the UK context. \nNext, key gaps in the UK regulatory framework are explored with reference to the drivers of \ngood corporate governance. A comprehensive review was undertaken to evaluate corporate \ngovernance-related developments in UK regulation since 1990. Policy initiatives were \nanalysed with regard to both their content and effectiveness in promoting each of the identified \ndrivers. Several potential gaps in coverage were identified in the areas of executive pay and \nemployees stakeholders. A number of potential gaps in effectiveness were also identified with \nregard to other key drivers such as boards, shareholder involvement, information disclosure, \nauditing, and the market for corporate control. The analysis was supported by feedback from a \nFocus Group of expert practitioners that took place at the DTI in January 2006. \nThe Report also emphasises that the effectiveness of corporate governance regulation depends \nvery much on balancing different governance demands and regulatory trade-offs. Corporate \ngovernance is shaped by a number of contingencies, complementarities, and costs. Various \norganisational contingencies may place different demands on corporate governance drivers, and \ntheir implementation is also associated with different sorts of costs. Looking more generally, \ndifferent drivers may act as complements or substitutes for one another. Better appreciation of such interdependencies is crucial to formulating a coherent regulatory strategy and balancing \nimportant regulatory trade-offs between the following - mandatory regulation (uniform \nrequirements) and more flexible forms of soft-law such as codes based on comply-or-explain \nprinciples and self-regulatory norms of professional groups. \nThis analysis suggests a number of areas for future research. Bearing in mind the depth and \nbreadth of the UK regulatory initiatives, it is important to verify whether they were followed by \nbehavioural changes of the participants in corporate governance mechanisms, including \nunintended consequences such as the development of ‘gaming’ practices. Further research is \nneeded on a potential ‘gatekeeper failure’ in situations where reliance on ‘reputational \nintermediaries’, such as auditors, securities analysts, attorneys, and other professionals, is not \nfully justified. Other research recommendations are related to wealth creation and performance \ntrade-offs. It is important to go beyond the question of maximizing shareholder returns and \nconsider to what extent different corporate governance configurations promote long-term, \nvalue-creating economic production in a fashion that benefits not only shareholders but also \nother groups that make specific investments in corporations. Finally, a more holistic approach \nto the effectiveness of corporate governance drivers requires further research on such aspects as \nstakeholder involvement, contingencies, complementarities, and cost aspects that may affect the \neffectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. \nThe authors would like to point out that, since the report was written, there have been various \ndevelopments, not least changes in UK law, which have overtaken some of the details in our \nanalysis. However, the basic review of the evidence basis and the perspectives offered remain \nvery much current.
Language: English
Subfield: Finance
Domain: Social Sciences
Keywords: corporate governance, corporate governance codes, corporate law reform, board of directors, shareholder activism, information disclosure, executive compensation, market for corporate control, stakeholder rights, information asymmetry, incomplete contracts, market failure, policy evaluation, corporate governance regulation, wealth protection, wealth creation
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1572049357
