Work

Local Coordination under Bounded Rationality: Coase Meets Simon, Finds Hayek

Year: 2010
Type: report
Abstract: This paper explores strategic behavior by agents in a network using an agent-based model. The model exhibits a tension between economic efficiency and the stability of the network in the face of incentives to change its configuration. This tension is to be expected because the conditions of the Coase Theorem are violated: the boundedly rational firms in the model lack the ability to discover efficient network configurations, let alone realize and sustain them through collective action. In computational experiments, as predicted by theory, firms frequently became locked into inefficient outcomes or endless cycles of mutual frustration. However, simple coordinating institutions such as property rights and bilateral bargaining dramatically improved outcomes, even for severely myopic firms. The results echo Hayek’s observations about local coordination in the economy at large, which led him to “marvel ” at the efficiency of the price system. But here there are no prices; instead firms exploited a source of self-organization, namely the structure of the payoffs. In the model, stable network configurations tend to be efficient (even though the converse is not true), so stability-promoting institutions tend to improve efficiency. While it is easy to construct counterexamples to this pattern, the computational results are robust to a wide range of model parameters, and I argue that the role played by stability in the model has plausible analogs in the real world.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1574303948
Cites: 41
Cited by: 2
Related to: 10