Compensation and Top Management Turnover
Year: 1997
Type: preprint
Abstract: An examination of CEO compensation and turnover in 452 large U.S. companies between 1984 and 1991 provides evidence that compensation policies play a significant role in retaining the services of top managers. We find inverse associations between the probability of CEO turnover and the amount by which their compensation is higher than expected. We also find inverse associations between the probability of CEO turnover and the dollar value of stock option compensation in relation to cash pay. The results, which are significant across the entire sample of CEOs, appear stronger for subsamples of CEO departures likely to have been voluntary.
Source: SSRN Electronic Journal
Authors: Hamid Mehran, David Yermack
Institution: New York University
Language: English
Subfield: Accounting
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1576175591