Work

Imperfect competition, sequential auctions, and emissions trading: An experimental evaluation

Year: 2000

Type: preprint

Abstract: This paper reports an experiment that studies the behavior of a monopolist on sequential auction markets for tradable permits. Using six sessions in a triple ABA crossover design, we investigate the cost-effectiveness of permit allocations and the division of trade gains on sequential bid, offer, and double auction markets. The main result is that cost-effectiveness and supra-competitive profits accrued by the monopolist are observed on all the three auction markets.

Source: RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

Author: Morten Søberg

Language: English

Topic: Auction Theory and Applications

Subfield: Management Science and Operations Research

Field: Decision Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

Open Access status: green

OpenAlex ID: W1585044523

Cites: 13

Cited by: 35

Related to: 10