Work

Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict

Year: 2014

Type: article

Abstract: Victorious alliances often fi ght about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fi ght against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fi ght against a common enemy. First, we find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fi ght and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the hold-up problem.

Source: Economic Inquiry

DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12151

Authors: Changxia Ke, Kai A. Konrad, Florian Morath

Institutions: Max Planck Society, Queensland University of Technology, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Language: English

Topic: Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Subfield: Safety Research

Field: Social Sciences

Domain: Social Sciences

SDG: Peace, justice, and strong institutions

Open Access status: green

Funder: Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft