Work

Heterogeneous Focal Points, Fairness, and Coordination *

Year: 2007
Type: preprint
Abstract: In games with multiple equilibria, the fairest equilibrium –in case one exists- may be the obvious solution for some players but not for others, and players can be aware of this heterogeneity. This paper theoretically explores how coordination could be achieved in this case. The model is consistent with abundant experimental evidence and explains, for instance, why (a) the attractiveness of the fair equilibrium, (b) out-of-equilibrium payoffs, (c) dominated strategies, and (d) the number of players and available strategies matter for coordination. The model is compared with alternative equilibrium selection criteria like risk and payoff dominance and ideas for new experiments are suggested.
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1592745735
Cites: 27
Cited by:
Related to: 9