Modifying Moral Dilemma Judgments: How the priming of Moral Rules Modifies Responses to Moral Dilemmas
Year: 2012
Type: dissertation
Abstract: Prior decision making research has covered issues ranging from economic decisions to moral judgment.Moral judgment studies indicate that the use of hypothetical dilemmas presents the ability to explore decision processes regarding morality (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001;Hauser, 2006; Koenigs et aI., 2007).Largely, judgment is measured by asking respondents to comment on the permissibility of an action presented in the moral dilemma (Ham & Van den Bos, 2010;Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007;O'Neill & Petrinovich, 1998).A variety of explanations have been used to try and explain moral judgment, but rarely have attempts been made to modify judgment.The present study examines the possibility of using priming to alter moral judgment.Prior results indicate that conceptual priming is sufficient in the modification of moral judgment (Broeders et aI., 2011).The results of the experiment indicate that priming may not clearly alter permissibility beliefs in moral judgment.Overall, decision makers did not find the moral dilemma permissible, which may have countered any priming effects.
Author: Warren Brandan Scott
Institution: Seton Hall University
Language: English
Subfield: Cognitive Neuroscience
Field: Neuroscience
Domain: Life Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W159293960
