Work

Loss Aversion and Community Standards of Fairness: the Role of Costs in Exchange Negotiations.

Year: 1992
Type: article
Abstract: Contrary to normative economic theory, empirical evidence suggests that (individuals') reference positions matter in choice behavior.Specifically, decision makers have been shown to behave in a loss aversive manner.Fuithesmore, opportunity costs, or foregone gains, are not treated symmetsically to out-of-pocket, or direct, costs.Consequently, opportunity costs do not appear to trigger loss aversion as no actual negative cash flows occur and the reference position, or status quo, is maintained.The latter finding also was established in the context of individual choice, or decision making.This paper tests for any consistent differences between the treatment of opportunity costs and direct costs in the context of dyadic negotiations.Two experiments contrasting opportunity costs with conceptually identical out-of-pocket, or direct, costs were conducted.The first experiment attempted to elicit the widespread, or community, suppost for neglecting opportunity costs from a 'prescriptive', third-party perspective.In particular, subjects (Ss) acting in the role of arbitrators were requested to indicate their preferred choice concerning the settlement of five asymmetric negotiation tasks.The second experiment tested for the support for, or enactment of, this (latent) community standard from the position of 'actual' parties to a negotiation.The experimental results suggest that both third-parties and negotiators subscribe to the notion that opportunity costs should be heavily discounted or not enter into fair outcome formulations and settlements.Conceptually analogous direct costs, however, were found to be included in negotiators' payoff schedules.Furthermore, this community standard appears rather robust to experimental manipulations, such as the prospect of third-party intervention, and biases associated with human information processing, such as the egocentric bias.To my parents.I would like to thank Professor Jack L. Knetsch for his invaluable assistance and unceasing patience and Professor Mark N. Wexler for a door that
Language: English
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1595077701
FWCI:
Cites: 75
Cited by: 1
Related to: 9