Year: 2010
Type: article
Abstract: . This paper describes the foundations of a market mechanism that was designed to stimulate more efficient provisions of forest ecosystem services to society. The proposed tool is a competitive multi-unit public goods subscription game of incomplete information. A conceptual and mathematical characterization of the game is followed by an illustrative example where Pareto-efficient bundles of timber, carbon and mature forest habitat services of a real forest are used in a simulated bidding game. Attractive features of the mechanism include the use of multi-criteria optimization to ensure only the most cost-efficient bundles of ecosystem services are offered for bidding, and that it does not rely on regulatory control or on com-plex valuation exercises that are otherwise needed in alternative methods such as the cap-and-trade scheme.
Institution: University of Washington
Language: English
Topic: Forest Management and Policy
Subfield: Forestry
Domain: Life Sciences
SDG: Life on land
Open Access status: diamond
Awards: G1163767817, G295322943, G8700983108
OpenAlex ID: W159553539