Year: 1912
Type: book
Abstract: Faith ' must underlie all ' Reason ' and pervade it, nay, that at bottom rationality itself is the supremest postulate of Faith.Without Faith, therefore, there can be no Reason, and initially the demands of ' Faith ' must be as legitimate and essentially as reasonable as those of the ' Reason ' they pervade.On the other hand, it enables us to draw the line between a genuine and a spurious ' Faith.'The spurious ' faith,' which too often is all theologians take courage to aspire to, is merely the Ostwald is not a professional philosopher at all, but a chemist, and has very likely never heard of Pragmatism ; but he sets forth the pragmatist procedure of the sciences in a perfectly masterly way.1 This essay, originally an Ethical Society address, appeared in the July 1903 number of the International Journal of Ethics, It is now reprinted with a few additions, the chief of which is the long note on pp.11-12.Its title has of course been objected to as putting the cart before the horse.To which it is easy to reply that nowadays it is no longer impracticable to use a motor car for the removal of a dead horse.And the paradox implied in the title is, of course, intentional.It is a conscious inversion of the tedious and unprofitable disquisitions on ' the metaphysical basis of this, that, and the other, which an erroneous conception of philosophical method engenders.They are wrong in method, because we have not de facto a science of first principles of unquestionable truth from which we can start to derive the principles of the special sciences.The converse of this is the fact, viz.that our ' first ' principles are postulated by the needs, and slowly secreted by the labours, of the special sciences, or of such preliminary exercises of our intelligence as build up the common-sense view of life.And so what my title means is, not an attempt to rest the ' final synthesis ' upon a single science, but rather that among the contributions of the special sciences to the final evaluation of experience that of the highest, viz.ethics, has, and must have, decisive weight.B ' That was very unreasonable of them.' ' I am not so sure of that.For after all they had only my word for it that I had really met you.' ' But did they not recognise what I said, and my manner of saying it ?' ' Not so as to feel sure.' 'And did they not think your whole account intrinsically probable and consistent ?' ' I hope I made it appear so.' ' Surely they did not think that you could invent a world like mine ?' ' I suppose they thought I might have dreamt it.'' What, a world so much better, more beautiful, co herent and rational, and, in two words, more real, than that in which they lived ?' ' There is nothing in all this to make it seem less of a dream rather than more.' ' Do you think they will believe you after this second visit ?' ' I doubt it.Why should they ?' ' It would seem, then, that we have no means of con vincing these wretches of the truth.'' I fear not ; so long as they can reasonably maintain that it is no truth at all.' ' You do not surely propose to defend their conduct ?' ' No, but I think it is by no means as unreasonable as you suppose.' ' I see that you are preparing to assert a greater paradox than ever I listened to from Zeno.' ' I am afraid that it may appear such.' 'Will you not quickly utter it?You see how keenly Aristotle is watching you, like a noble dog straining at the leash.' ' Let me say this, then, that though I can no more doubt your existence and that of the lovely world wherein you abide than I can my own, yet I cannot blame my fellow men for refusing to credit all this on my sole assertion.They have not seen you, nor can they, seeing that you will neither descend to them nor can they rise 'USELESS' KNOWLEDGE 29 ' Yes, I know that ; you mean as exercise of function ?The speculative life also is something we do, it is the exercise of a characteristic human activity, and so has an excellence and contributes to our happiness.'' Precisely.'' Very well then, what I meant was that you did not derive practical from theoretic activity.'' Certainly not' ' The two are as far opposed as is practically possible.'' Yes.' ' But speculative wisdom is by far the loftier ?' ' Of course.' ' And far too lofty to be useful ?' ' So I maintain.'' Very well again.Now for a third view.Is it not possible to maintain with you that the practical and the speculative reason are different and opposed to each other, but that the former is the superior, so that in the end we must believe and practically act on what we do not know to be true ?And is not this the converse of your view, 'USELESS' KNOWLEDGE 33the eternal truths of mathematics and the like one may surely affirm that they necessarily exist for all intelli gences ?' ' Even this is more than I can grant you.' ' How so ?' ' They seem to me to be also relative to us ; nay, human institutions of the plainest kind.' ' Is it not self-evident and absolutely certain that the straight line is the shortest between two points ?' ' That is the definition of distance.It will do in the sense in which you use it, if I may add, " for one living in a spatial world which behaves like ours, and apparently yours, once he has succeeded in postulating a system of geometry which suits his world."'' I really do not understand you.' ' I fear I have not the space to explain myself, and to show you the practical aim of our assumptions concerning " Space," even if I dared to discuss the foundations of geometry in the presence of Plato.But it really does not affect my point.What I desire to maintain is that the eternal truths are at bottom postulates, demands we make upon our experience because we need them in order that it may become a cosmos fit to live in.' ' But I do not find myself postulating them at all.They are plainly self-evident and axiomatic.'' That is only because your axioms are postulates so ancient and so firmly rooted that no one now thinks of disputing them.' ' Your doctrine seems as monstrous as it is unfamiliar.' ' I can neither help that nor establish it fully at this juncture.Perhaps, if the gods are willing, I shall find another occasion l to expound to you the proofs of this doctrine, and even, if the gods are gracious, to convince you.For it seems to me that in a manner you already admit the principle of my doctrine.' ' It would greatly surprise me if I did.' ' You contend, do you not, that concerning ethical matters it is impossible to have the right opinion without, 1 See the essay on ' Axioms as Postulates ' in Personal Idealism.D
Source: Macmillan eBooks
Author: F. C. S. Schiller
Language: English
Subfield: Philosophy
Field: Arts and Humanities
Domain: Social Sciences
Open Access status: green
OpenAlex ID: W1597736635